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Popular Culture and the Meaning of Feelings 
n the human sciences at large, it is still the 
case that only literary criticism and psycho-
analysis seek to theorize with any degree of 
generosity a place for the feelings in the 
practice of their discipline. Of late, indeed, 
the most weighty presences in both literary criticism 
and psycho-analysis have worked to expel mere 
subjectivity and the theoretically irrelevant but idio-
syncratically incontestable feelings which are held 
to define subjectivity. The structures that are left 
become venerable in virtue of their scientific stand-
ing: the fierce induration of such Parisian worthies 
as Julia Kristeva, Jacques Lacan, and (in his playful, 
dandyish way) Jacques Derrida has worked to 
reproach devout Gallophiles in England for ever 
countenancing 'sincere and vital emotion' and all 
the emotional vocabulary-baggage of the 
bourgeoisie. And even in philosophy, which has 
taken the place of the emotions seriously, the 
subject has come clearly down the list of both 
difficulty and prestige- epistemology first, then the 
theory of meaning, then (perhaps) metaphysics, 
and only then the emotions as the difficult adjunct 
of ethics. 
The smallish corner of the human sciences 
occupied by questions of feeling and emotion (and 
for the purposes of this paper I shall make no 
conceptual distinction between them) looks at first 
and second sight preposterously too small a space. 
It is so plain to see that the experience of 
understanding human behaviour is coterminous 
with the bounds of feeling set by the capacity of the 
understanding (and interpreting ) agent. The 
vindication of this straight-forward and intuitive 
claim is the point of this paper, although it is a point 
which of its nature can only be pressed home by 
precise assertion and recognisable definitions, 
rather than by argument. 
In the present circumstances, however, the 
urgency of such assertion is in the biggest sense 
vital. For the small corner of academic intellectual 
life allocated to the emotions prefigures their 
significance on the vaster planes of public life. This 
is not to say that this significance is small; it isn't. 
But it is quite specific and on the argument of this 
paper, quite specifically mistaken. 
Within the frames of customary interpretat-
ion, feelings and emotions are classified as private 
but precious, and counterposed to the unfeeling 
public world, where decisions are thought to be 
taken according to a model of rationality founded 
upon those observable, empirical facts the 
computation of which is held to guarantee 
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objectivity. Such a definition throws into relief a 
series of antinomies simply to quote which is to do 
much to sense in what I am callinq 'customary' 
meanings and interpretative motions the essential 
structures of our present ontologies. Consider 
these: 
private 
personally possessed 
subjective 
feelings 
imagination 
values 
women 
arts 
morality 
public 
externally known 
objective 
reason 
calculation 
fact 
men 
science 
politics 
The terms of the left-hand column 
interpenetrate in the domain of feelings, which is 
conventionally protected not only as being one's 
own, occupied by the personally possessed 
qualities of self, but also as being unassailable: that 
is, you can't be mistaken about your own feelings, 
and you certainly can't be told by someone else to 
improve or alter them. Private in essence and, as 
we hope, intense in substance as they are, feelings 
define the human world-reality and create the 
meanings which make sense of the inane events 
occurring within that reality, turning them into 
manageable experience. 
The primacy won for the feelings, since 
Romanticism released Hume's 'civil passions' from 
the correctness of that civility, and allowed the vast 
detonation of spontaneity, ardour, and 
expressiveness to break the connections between 
virtue and happiness, duty and sincerity 1, has led 
the suntanned hedonists of consumer living back 
from the great freedoms of Beethoven and 
Wordsworth to some small and dismal rooms. In 
the armchairs of the encounter group, and the 
analyst's comfortable closet we find the dire and 
deadly-sweet narcissism to which our customary 
version of private feelings can lead, especially in the 
carefully self-regarding affluence of Ordinary 
People, Kramer versus Kramer, and A Bouquet of 
Barbed Wire. 
This corner of the culture has turned itself into 
the laboratory of the feelings, whose research 
reports are the corresponding bedrooms of such 
films and television programmes as I have named. 
As Richard Sennet and Christopher Lasch both 
claim 2, in their general, rather unchecked and 
polemical way, the encounter-group narcissist 
searches for a deep cleansing of the self from the 
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destroying, polluting structures of all social 
institutions in the name of a perfect purity of free 
aspiration, realized in a series of personal 
intimacies, unfettered by dead conventions and 
traditions, most surely confirmed in the passionate 
conviction of a fulfilled, unfulfillable sexuality. 
There is, no doubt, a genuine good some-
where near the heart of the more vapid 
congenialities in the direr encounter groups. In 
amongst the mixture of frightful and touching self-
interrogation, the 'truth for me', the 'getting in 
touch with my feelings', the 'is it feeling right?' is a 
main valuation of the culture in which the 
satisfaction of emotional needs is situated in the 
very middle of our teleology. 
It is easy to be brisk with this view. We might 
say, with the Left, that such a preoccupation with 
personal feelings is merely the last refuge of a 
bourgeoise driven out of an intelligible public life by 
the unintelligible centrifuge of monopoly capitalism 
(in a phrase), and left to make the best it can out of 
the delights of the consumers' domesticity. To 
coddle personal feelings (the argument runs) in a 
two-thirds starved world is, strictly an irresponsibie 
and impossible evasion of political reality. There 1s 
justice in such a view of course. Indeed, we might 
say on behalf of the encounter groupists and their 
sympathizers in the T olkien commando that they 
too repudiate the cosy dissatisfactions of 
consumerism by seeking an immaterial and socially 
placeless intimacy which rests neither on property 
nor acquisition. They too are looking for a non-
utilitarian non-exploitative social ethic. What is 
more, the power of Romanticism is irreversible; its 
dizzy brew combined the elements of democratic 
rights, personal fulfilments, and nationalism, which 
have been appealed to by as mixed a bunch of 
liberators in the past forty years as Fidel Castro, 
Abdul Nasser, Ho Chi Minh, Kwame Nkrumah, 
Lech Walesa and Bobby Sands. The implicit appeal 
to the power of spontaneous feeling latent in inter-
national nationalism is the most dangerous as well 
as the most exhilarating of the energy veins laid 
down by the Romantic movement. 
If I am right, however, about the present 
definitions, valuings,and organisation of feeling, that 
danger is the greater for its misunderstanding. For 
we feel our feelings within the social structures we 
have for their allocation. If we return for a while 
from the larger geographical ranges of internat-
ional feeling to the scope of British customary 
culture, then it is more plausible to claim to make 
that insofar as our conceptual-material structures 
distort our expressible feelings, to that extent the 
whole social order is twisted out of its 'natural' 
shape. 
To speak so is to endorse naturalism with a 
vengeance. It is to claim, with Rousseau and 
Romanticism, that there is a natural way to feel 
which is coterminous with the natural way to live, 
ctnd that the discovery of this co-inCidence is the 
moment of the good life. Well, there are 
innumerable ways of living the good life, both within 
and between cultures, and it is by now certain, after 
a century of classical sociology and classical 
novels, that however tricky it may be to theorize 
the endogenesis of feelings, they are equally the 
producers of social structures as they are their 
expression. In other words, the human spirit and 
human culture are mutually embedded, and 
feelings themselves not only have no natural 
primacy, but are inseparable from and 
simultaneous with both cognition and the intran-
sigent matters-of-fact which similarly produced and 
are produced by both Geist and culture. 
Yet while it may be true that this moment of 
our historical corner has given untoward 
prominence to feelings and emotions, we all of us 
go on having more or less strong feelings, and have 
little choice in attempting a science of human 
nature and affairs, and its historical hermeneutic, 
but to imagine that people at all times and places 
have similarly had feelings and needed urgently to 
interpret, understand, and improve them. Having 
said which, what may we convincingly claim about 
the status and nature of feelings, which may be 
both recognizable to the popular view and its 
antinomies as I have tabulated them, and replace 
the feelings in some more public and less excluded 
room in the mansion of the human sciences in 
particular, and popular education in general? As I 
have argued, any such venture must commit itself 
against the deeply traditional paradigm in the 
human sciences (by which phrase I only intend the 
available conceptual frameworks of intellectual life 
at all its levels, from the five-year-old's reception 
class to the Ph.D. seminar). This paradigm 
identifies the primary qualities of the world as 
objective and realist; an always strong but largely 
underground opposition insists upon the singular 
view of humans as self-interpreting animals as 
being utterly solvent of realism; this is the class-
struggle of the human sciences, and the heart of 
hermeneutics. The nature and location of our idea 
of feeling (sic) is its dominant conundrum. 
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I shall now attempt to assert a series of 'emotions-claims' which go some way towards placing emotions on a hermeneutic agenda. This is not, as they say, an academic point. It is plainly true that all forms of educat-
ion attempt to make systematic the dominant 
modes of knowing, of interpreting, and of self-
education;3 in which case, to get out of the dead 
ends of educational narcissism, and the confident 
falsehoods of a physical science-based objectivity, 
is to give education some chance of understanding 
the world better, and to make it political in a more 
than sentimental sense. In an effort to be firm about 
the emotions-claims, I shall list them numerically~ 
(1) It is generally acknowledged that 
emotions have objects; that, for example, the 
experience of fear has typically a structure, in 
which the fear is fear of something which is 
necessarily part of that structure, and towards 
which the emotion is suitable. This is brought out 
by our view that persistently objectless or nameless 
fear is a neurotic condition. This, as we say, 
irrational fear is so described, because we cannot, 
in turn, ascribe what Charles T aylor names the 
imports towards which the fear is our response. 
Saying what an emotion is like is a matter of 
describing imports. Thus, in order to fmpack the 
structure of the feeling 'shame' we typically identify 
the shameful features of the situation. By the same 
token, though, we cannot love mistakenly (the 
statement clearly has no content), we may well be 
mistaken as to whether or not we do 'really love' 
somebody, and try to determine this by describing 
imports truthfully. There is a salient identity 
between this descriptive process, and the 
descriptive processes by which we sort out a 
variety of hermeneutic utterances, as for instance, 
the placing of moral insights or justifying aesthetic 
judgements5. 
(2) Imports are subject-referring in· ways 
directly evidenced by the language of emotions. 
'When my love swears that she is made of truth, 
I will believe her though I know she lies ... ' 
Shakespeare's piercing lines emphasize a familiar 
disjuncture in the everyday recognition of 
emotions, but one which insists not only on the 
subject-referring property of feeling (which is 
obvious) but also on the non-secondary force of 
this referral which in itself confutes the behaviour-
ism refusing to deal in internal states bevond 
reflexes. When we say with Shakespeare 'I believe 
her with all my heart, even though I know she is 
lying to me', we emphasize that subject referring 
imports entail a subject who is aware of them 
intuitively, and therefore requires his emotion as a 
way of grasping the imports themselves. His 
emotions may change on reflection but without 
emotions he cannot work out what has happened 
in the first place. (This is the point of the excellently 
~ouble-edged joke in the famous Marilyn Monroe 
film Some Like it Hot in which T any Curtis 
pretends to have lost the capacity to feel the 
emotion, love, and the sensation (feeling) of 
physical desire. Marilyn helps him find them). 
(3) Feelings and emotions are a mode of 
acce~s to imports, therefore; but, as ShakesJ.leare's 
two lmes so pamfully brmg out, knowing X while 
feeling Y doesn't win the day for either. As the 
encounter-groupists and the deadly protagonists of 
the American television confessional Couples are 
all too apt to forget, the feelings in question may be 
horrible ones, and the difficulty of this can't be 
solved in Plato's surely far too simple view that 
virtuous action is a necessary consequence of 
knowledge of the good. The directness of his line 
between knowledge and action is far too early to 
take account of the impulses unleashed by 
Romanticism behind the emotions. Perhaps a 
mildiy neo-Platonic proposition could, however 
venture that a good grasped by all our feelmgs and 
emotions as the fuilest awareness of what is going 
on will be epistemically grasped as import in a 
superior way to a good grasped by a limited range 
of emotions. Loving the good, on this argument, 
involves full insight as a consequence of 
comprehensive feeling; loving the bad, on the anti-
platonic hand, is not, regrettably, just ignorance or 
lack of knowledge. 
(4) Given these claims, it foilows that our 
awareness of the good is a function of our own 
feelings (and emotions). Feeling is what it is, first, as 
I have asserted, in virtue of the dialectical motion 
between itself and its 'imports'. Secondly, it is so in 
virtue of various constituent feelings as they played 
upon imports, and which it incorporates. Thus, 
remorse (guilt) as many ethical theorists as well as 
psychologists6 have remarked for one necessary 
basis for acting altruistically at all, expresses in its 
structure a sense of right and wrong. To feel 
remorse is to acknowledge that you have done 
wrong when you might have done right. Under the 
impulse of such feeling, it is natural to proceed to 
further articulation of our situation (an articulation 
not merely presupposed but constituted by our 
initial feeling)?, which may in turn transform the 
initial feelings - the process clearly recognizable as 
emotional growth. 
(5) Feelings, in a key proposition ascribe a 
form to what happens to us. If we take this propo-
sition as the culmination of my four premises, we 
may (truistically) conclude that feeiings are bound 
up definitionally with their own articulation: self-
understanding or misundersta!'lding alike shape 
what we really feel, and this essentially linguistic 
claim returns me to the form of hermeneutics. 
These propositions, once granted, prefigure the 
hermeneutic (and human) sequence which, 
structurally inseparable as it is from emotional 
response to the imports of eventual experience, 
and in spite of the customary-cuitural allocations of 
feelings and emotions, reaffirms the essential 
relations of feeling and cognition, and of both to 
ethics and politics. In a phrase, and on these claims, 
feelings and emotions are every bit as much part of 
the momentum of pubiic life and thought as the self-
congratulatory and austere rattonalities of 
computation and so-called pragmatic expediency. 
To restate: feelings are a structural ground of 
cognition: both impel the necessary and human 
motion of interpretation, and are therefore no less 
necessarily linguistic, and intersubjective. This 
intersubjectivity can only be understood (after 
interpretation) in relation to the 'imports' which 
define situations. Such (linguistic) understanding is 
moral, and, obviously, may be taught. 
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HI 
quipped with the satisfactions of these 
conclusions, how may we deploy them 
in the hermeneutic process? More 
precisely, how shall these revisions 
upon the popular and conventional def-
initions and locations of feelings in relation to 
cognitive status and public (politica~) values.' be 
made to tell in the actualities of social practices, 
perhaps supremely in those areas . held to be 
immune to the invasions of naturalism and the 
intellig~ntsia? The cue is provided by <?liffo~d 
Geertz's account of the Balinese cockfight m 
which seeking to locate the meaning of the intense 
and o;ganised passions aroused by the 'deep play' 
of the occasion, he dissolves distinctions between 
art and sport, and proposes the analysis of either in 
terms of 'the use of emotion for cognitive ends' 8. 
By this token we could ask of our P?pular cultur~, 
how it provides for the perpetuation of cert~m 
feelings. But this might seem either t~o v<;>lunt~nst 
or too functionalist, as though we mamtam a given 
practice because otherwise the desirable feelings 
for which it was the set of imports might lapse. No 
doubt this does happen, in part; some people go to 
church in order to respond with the appropriate 
feelings to the rhetorical tropes, the strokes of 
alliteration and assonance, the grand cadences 
which have no literal meaning for them; others 
deliberately exercise themselves on a June 
Saturday a couple of hundred feet sheer up Avon 
Gorge on the edge of two steel pegs in order. to 
experience the thrills of danger in a culture which 
has made the rest of the week happily safe and 
sound. Without matins and mountaineering 
religious feeling9 and the feeling of danger might 
substantially vanish from the available range of 
intelligible feelings. 
But to understand such institutions and prac-
tices as intended for the prompting occasions and the 
expressions of deep feeling is to understand them 
on the terms of the standard definitions and 
meanings of feeling. The ambition of this paper is 
not to imagine that a revolution of human na~ure 
may be so boiling up that benign feeling~ can, with a 
little pedagogic help, reoccupy the citadels and 
redoubts of the mind now occupied by the ice-cold 
rationalists of the books of numbers. Rather, it is to 
give a small reminder to teachers of the ~uman 
sciences that the interpretative frames wh1ch are 
what we all have for the understanding of human 
action and which, in a crude synopsis, we may be 
said to fit over events in order to bring them within 
the concepts of our experience, are themselves 
partially ordered by the quali.ty and inevitab~lity of 
our feelings about that action and exp~nen~e. 
Thus to understand matins or mountameermg 
requires us to sympathise (in a very strong sense of 
a now commonplace verb) with the intentions and 
motives of those who are practising worship and 
climbing, and although not to be obliged to 
experience the same feelings as the practitioners 
(clearly, we may try to understand people's actions 
without remotely being able to know what they felt 
as they performed them), certainly to seek to 
situate the action within the contexts of as large a 
realm of sympathetic feelings as possible. 
It may be that 'sympathetic feelings' as a 
phrase has too pious as well as too banal a ring to it. 
Let us say that sympathy is the modality and focus 
by which many different feelings find specific form 
in relation to a particular object and subject. 
Putting the claim so has first, the merit of restoring 
the notion of sympathy to a central place in the 
hierarchy of moral-emotive terms, secondly, of 
refuting the evasion of the difficulty which some 
theorists attempt through the neoligism 'empathy', 
and finally, of suggesting that sympathy is a 
conductor for the various feelings which flow 
between subjects (and are altered in their recip-
rocal passages) in the essential motion of inter-
pretation. No doubt, as aestheticians have 
vigorously claimed since Romanticism, it has been 
in art and our response to it, that this reciprocal 
motion is first developed and educated, but it is 
fundamental to life itself. 
Now I have already insisted that a clash 
between cognition and feeling isn't resolved by 
handing victory over to the senior faculty, 
according to your ideological preferences. But the 
power of the claim is that sympathy and jts 
cognates, compassion, pity, mercy, all stand on the 
essential ground of interpretation and understand-
ing; the further claim is that it is a characteristic of 
human nature to recognize such ground as its own 
epistemic domain. Hermeneutics attempts to 
make a sufficiently stable and continuous method 
of this endless human state of being. The drastic 
weakness of such hermeneutics is that it can only 
make methodical the first half of 'the science of 
human affairs'lo, that which permits us to 
understand backwards, to show how we come to 
be in the position we are in at the present; lacking a 
critical theory of human interests, it has no means 
of thinking forwards, of telling human beings what 
to do - which may be one reason why 
contemporary liberalism finds hermeneutics so 
attractive. But this chasm stands happily beyond 
the terminus of my argument. Here it is sufficient to 
say that, like any other intellectual discipline, 
hermeneutics seeks to order and comprehend 
(another large concept) the incessant inanity of 
ordinary everyday life by finding ways of stopping it 
still for long enough to permit reflection. 
Stopping life, by my token, means enclosing 
(comprehending) an action within a larger context 
of sympathy. To do this, the interpreter requires a 
sufficient capacity for that end)sing movement of 
the sensibility. He or she must be capable of (have 
the capacity for) the necessary feeling and its 
direction by sympathy, if there is to be any 
movement of understanding and compassion. The 
familiar, reassuring conclusion must be that an 
understanding person must have a large capacity 
for feeling, and be wisely practised in the 
articulation of that feeling so that the smypathy is 
not rnute (even if its speech may be heard in the 
eloquence of sympathetic gesture rather than 
words). It is impossibly difficult to predict whether a 
particular person will be enlarged in his or her 
capacity for intelligent feeling by experience of life, 
or whether he will be cramped up and closed either 
by suffering or success. Nonetheless the truism 
stands that what the Catholic Church long since 
named as the natural cardinal virtues, justice, 
prudence, temperance, fortitude, and those 
dependent and detailed ancillaries amongst the 
gifts of the holy spirit which include humility, joy, 
peace, patience, benignity, mildness and 
modesty11 , are connected in both essence and 
substance with right and true feeling, and that the 
free and relevant play of each upon the other just is 
the proper way of studying mankind. 
None of these rather preaching adjurations 
can do much more than pn~pare the good man for 
thinking about society. And in any case, goodness is 
not enough by itself. A sufficient social theory 
begins, no doubt, from a picture of the good life, but 
must proceed by way of some account of how to 
bring it about. It follows that the wise and learned 
interpreter comes to human performance with a 
relevant sense of what feelings are needed to 
understand what is going on, and in so doing is 
bound to criticize that performance for the feelings 
it lacks or distorts which, being present, would 
have made up a more compelling version oft he good 
life. 
This comes out most simply in the practice of 
the great novelist, who is great in virtue of the prose 
expression she finds with which to summon our 
sympathy as the medium of our understanding. In 
Felix Halt, George Eliot presents a moment at 
which Mrs. Transome, the elderly, haughty, bitter 
and pitiful mother of the secondary hero, knows 
herself yet again trapped by her scheming, bland 
lawyer, once her lover, to whom 'moral vulgarity 
cleaved.... like an hereditary odour'. After 
Jermyn's speech, George Eliot goes on: 
'Every sentence was as pleasant to her as if it had 
been cut in her bared arm. Some men's kindness 
and love-making are more exasperating, more 
humiliating than others' derision, but the pitiable 
woman who has once made herself secretly dep-
endent on a man who is beneath her in feeling, must 
bear that humiliation for fear of worse. Coarse 
kindness is at least better than coarse anger; and in 
all private quarrels the duller nature is triumphant 
by reason of its dullness'l2. 
The first sentence, in its understated 
plainness, makes the reader shrink for very 
sympathy -'cut in her bared arm'- so long as his 
attention is full upon the page (the movement must be 
mutual; he must be, in D.W. Harding's phrase, in a 
'bond with the author'). The subsequent 
generalizing of sexual relations in power and 
dependence turns on that sympathetic wounding. 
If the novelist cannot win it, or the reader does not 
give it, the moralizing is vapid. If both do, the 
opacity of moral statement clears into the transpar-
ency of fact. 
I am claiming that such are the processes and 
procedures of interpretation and judgement: in life, 
literature and social theory. First, that feelings 
themselves are initially ethica/13 , and intimate and 
central to cognition and recognition of the social 
and public world; second, that these feelings must 
be incorporated into that revised account of theory 
and practice in the human sciences which has been 
their main preoccupation for a decade; third, that 
such revision is necessarily conducted and made 
methodical by close attention to the rhetorical 
tropes (metaphor and metonymy) by which writers 
of all kinds engage with our sympathy with the 
predicaments of others; fourth, that this 
hermeneutic helix criticizes the actualities of life in 
terms of an imaginary but plausible good life, and 
must of its nature capture what is desired only in its 
immanence as visible ·in what is actual. This is the 
political heart of all social theory14, and the only 
point of that education which is intended to 
reproduce the culture, and strive for its 
improvement. 
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t now remains briefly to vindicate such criti-
cism in praxis, and to show some of the ways 
in which a deep blankness as to certain feel-
ings leaves British popular culture at the 
moment impoverished and deadly: If my 
argument is true, the criticism can only be made by 
someone able to feel for himself those feelings 
largely absent from the culture, and these he must 
have learned from whatever opportunities he could 
make to discover and name them. Thus and thus is 
the process of all education, seen as the mutual 
advance of edification and criticism. 
Edification, in its etymology, connotes a 
building up of personal capacity- for experience, 
thought, feeling, life itself. Criticism, in the 
structure of its meaning, denotes a movement of 
thought towards a subject from a position outside 
that subject. Taken together in a reach-me-down 
definition, education allows an individual (or a 
class) to identify the defects of the subject in the 
name of a better alternative in past or future. 
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Now there are innumerable ways of living 
good lives; the great contribution of the historical 
anthropology and ethnographies which have been 
such an astonishing achievement of Western 
human science in the past half-century has been to 
exemplify this truth. Consequently, any criticism of 
our present life and life-in-death - that criticism 
without which there could be no future- may take 
one of a large number of perspectives, the roughest 
grouping of which may be said at first glance to be 
either conservative when comparative criteria are 
taken from the past, and radical or Utopian when 
the criteria are taken from the future. But this, in 
turn, will hardly do. I have already argued that we 
can only think forward after understanding 
backwardsis. We think forwards in terms of our 
version of future forms of life immanently 
discernible in past and present. How else could it 
be so? In a formula, therefore, we criticize the 
present in terms of the best imaginable versions of 
that present (itself inevitably a product of its past) 
which may be feasible for the future. 
Such criticism-with-edification typically 
proceeds by narrative. I characterized earlier the 
conventional narratives recounted of present 
emotions and what they are. On the method pro-
posed here, understanding human action itself 
(inclusive of the emotions it expresses) is a product 
of completing its idiosyncratic finitude from an 
infinite number of possibilities. That is to say, we 
interpret and understand by trying out against the 
facts how they might have been otherwise. For exam-
le, contemporary narratives of the emotions largely 
exclude such feelings as fervour, ardour, idealism, 
passion; my criticism of, for instance, the 
contemporary hero and heroine would be in terms 
of their exclusion of these youthful and desirable 
emotions, themselves the product of Romanticism 
and all indispensable to anyone committed to 
imagining a Utopia and tearing up the roots 
(radicalism) of a presently wicked way of life. Of 
course, in historical perspective, these same 
feelings and the qualities which they shape in 
expressive action were called to far from admirable 
causes, particularly in the defence of some of the 
more horrible forms of .imperialism. But to 
acknowledge this truth is to make my point: 
understanding human action as the only ground for 
praxis involves bringing to bear as round and full a 
grasp of feeling as possible (compassion once 
more; and compassion is not necessarily to be 
expressed· by looking sad and sweet-faced, and 
speaking in a very low voice). We can understand 
the best of past ardour and idealism as missing 
from the cool, uncommitted, unreflexive hero and 
heroine of the mass media- Robert Redford and 
Faye Dunaway- without falling into the error of 
supposing these feelings to be best directed into 
praxis in the lives of Tom Brown or Will Ladislaw, 
or even Alexander Blok. Inasmuch as the stars 
look down on our culture and are (in a phrase) 
looked up to as life-models, then the wry, 
uncommitted, nice, well-off but mobile, 
invulnerable (really), Jfeelinglessly sexual and 
narcissist characters represented by as mixed a 
crew as the local heroes of Local Hero, Paul 
Newman, Dustin Hoffman, Meryl Streep, Jeremy 
Irons,I6 Mary Tyler Moore, Sebastian Coe, Chris 
Evert, Mike Brearley, and the Prince and Princess 
of Wales, express a main stream of feeling for the 
times. 
The feelings and imports of the situations and 
actions these men and women dominate are clearly 
incapable of teaching a grasp of the good. (Well, 
Yes!) The contexts of each are placed in the realms 
of gold, where the glamour figures of wealth, 
prestige and enviable hedonism wave to us from 
the stairs leading up to the door of Concorde. To 
grasp the meaning of these events requires little 
movement of sympathy, little completion from the 
larger stores of feeling recorded in the culture, only 
a spasm of that attenuated, intense but colourless 
longing we call envy, which at once fuels mimicry 
and helplessness. 
Such cultural commination is familiar 
enough. In conditions of the loss of power, of deep 
confusions in national identity, in the face of the 
incredibility of capitalism, we drastically lack, in 
both Western Europe and in the USA, sufficient 
and frequent images of good lives. This conclusion 
transpires contingently from the examples I glance 
at. My main intention however is to canvass the 
view that, at the present conjuncture, the called-for 
move from hermeneutics to critical theory will 
identify the hideous failings of present feelings as 
registered in the narratives of our actions, not 
merely from a political position, which is tautolo-
gical, but from a political position emerging from 
the best versions of revisionist socialism. In other, 
less unctuous words, the hermeneutic method 
outlined here rests on absolute presuppositions 
which identify capitalism as incapable of bringing 
about a decent life. The absent quantity in this 
conclusion is destruction itself. Criticism of the 
present by drawing cheques on the millenium is the 
proper, indeed only, business of teachers and 
intellectuals; but unless they see plainly the 
structural exterminism17 of the world they criticize 
as pressing headlong towards the end, their work 
will lack the critical emotional dimensions of fear 
and urgency. The means of production are now 
and globally the means of destruction, and social 
theory, which simply is, in turn, the forms of 
knowledge, must inscribe in its dynamics the 
emotions capable of feeling and thinking this deadly 
fact. 
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1. A history of ideas finely retold from within Europ-
ean literature by Lionel Trilling in Sincerity and 
Authenticity, Oxford 1972. 
2. Richard Sennett: The Fall of Public Man, Cam-
bridqe 1976. Christopher Lasch: The Culture of 
Narcissism, Warner Books 1979. 
3. A term I take from Richard Rorty in Philosophy and 
the Mirror of Nature (Basil Blackwell1981), where 
he wants, reassuringly, to render the German 
Bi/dung with some less fatally anaesthetized word 
than 'Education'. 
4. I am crucially indebted in this second section to an 
unpublished paper by Charles Taylor 'Self-inter-
preting animals' which he gave to my seminar series 
at Bristol 'Interpretation and the Human Sciences'. 
I am, as always, immensely grateful to him for his 
ideas. 
5. Wittgenstein implies this in saying that giving 
reasons for liking a poem is the same as giving 
further descriptions. See Conversations on 
Aesthetics, C. Barrett ed. Blackwell, 1969. 
6. See for each version, Thomas Nagel, The Possibility 
of Altruism, Oxford 1970; and !an Suttie, The 
Oriqins of Love and Hate, Chatto & Wind us, 1935. 
7. AlthouJ!h he over-priveleges initial feeling, this is a 
process explored With wonderful subtlety by Jean-
Paul Sartre. in Sketch of a Theory of the Emotions 
(1939), Methuen 1962. 
8. Clifford Geertz, 'Notes from the Balinese Cock-
fight' The Interpretation of Cultures, Hutchinson 
1975, pp. 444-5. 
9. This commonplace, I take it, animated the list of 
worthy atheists who joined Anglicans in the petition 
to the Church of England Synod not to replace the 
Book of Common Prayer and the Authorised Vers-
ion with Series Ill and the New English Bible. 
10. RG. Collingwood's great phrase in his Autobio-
graphy (Oxford 1938) where he summarizes an 
account of its first outline. 
11. I ought to make clear that I am not practising Chris-
tian apologetics under cover of social theory, but 
speak, non-polemically as an atheist. 
12. Felix Holt (1866), Penguin 1972, p. 202 
13. A case implied but disappointingly understated by 
Bernard Williams, in 'Morality and the Emotions' 
Problems of the Self, Cambridge, 1973. 
14. This slogan carries me over from hermeneutics to 
critical theory, this latter phrase meaning not 
literary criticism, but politics in earnest. Most of 
what I say derives ultimately from Hegel, but more 
latterly is summarized by Gabriel Kortian, in M eta-
critique (Cambridge 1981) and Raymond Geuss in 
The Idea of a Critical Theory, Cambridge 1981. 
15. It is an argument more fully developed in the 
chapter on RG. Collingwood in my Radical 
Earnestness: English Social Theory 1880-1980, 
Martin Robertson 1982. 
16. Two names suggested by The French Lieutenant's 
Woman, whose moral is exactly mine. 
17. 'Exterminism' is a term coined by E.P. Thompson 
in the title essay to the collection edited by him and 
many others, Exterminism and Cold War, New 
Left Books/Verso, 1982. The concluding point, on 
the urgency of theorizing violence, I take as it 
stands from Anthony Giddens in an unpublished 
paper. I am in his debt, as we all are. 
Appreciation: Reno C. Borg 
by Professor Joseph M. Falzon 
Like so many others who knew him and valued 
his friendship, , I was deeply shocked to learn of the 
passing away of Mr. Reno Borg, Director of 
Education after a career in the Department 
spanning 37 years. I first met Reno at St. Michael's 
Training College in 1949/50 when we were both 
students; even then, he was already showing 
qualities of leadership which were to stand him in 
good stead as he successively occupied posts of 
increasing responsibility - from a primary school 
teacher with a class of 30 children to the Director-
ship of the Department of Education with a 
complement of over 3,000. It is one of the unfor-
tunate facts of life that as people assume greater 
responsibilities, they tend to lose friends faster than 
they make them; Reno was an exception: he lost 
very few friends. On one of the last occasions I met 
him, a few weeks before his death, as he and I were 
thinking of organising a reunion of the St. Michael's 
College 1949-50 year groups, he rattled off from 
memory the names of most of the members of that 
year group and was looking forward to meeting 
them all again. 
Mr. Borg was an active member of several 
committees and boards, among which were the 
Commission for the Development of Higher 
Education, the Advisory Council for Education and 
the Foundation of International Studies. His wide 
experience of matters educational will be sorely 
missed during the meetings of these committees. 
As Reno enters a new life, he leaves to mourn 
his passing his wife Laura, his sons Geoffrey and 
Andrew, and his daughter Lorraine- a graduate of 
this Faculty- as well as a great number of friends. 
21 
